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 Martin Heidegger is generally regarded as one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth 
century and in particular as one of the most influential figures within the new phenomenological 
movement in philosophy, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl at the turn of that century.  Yet, despite this 
reputation, complete agreement about what Heidegger’s philosophical relation to Husserl’s idea of 
phenomenology exactly is or about what Heidegger’s ‘Being-question’ actually is and about which 
particular tradition in the history of philosophy his thinking of Being follows, has not been reached.  
Heidegger, however, makes two general claims concerning his topic in philosophy that are relevant 
both to its philosophical and to its historical evaluation.  First, Heidegger maintains that the ‘Being-
question’ is a ‘simple matter’ of thought, but that this simple matter of thought was forgotten in the 
unfolding of the history of philosophy (metaphysics) itself.  Second, Heidegger maintains that the 
contemporary phenomenological movement in philosophy, inaugurated by Husserl, should take this 
issue as its main ‘theme’. This paper examines both of these claims made by Heidegger, focusing 
specifically on the way in which Heidegger’s topic in philosophy unfolds both distinctively and 
controversially within Husserl’s idea of transcendental phenomenology.  It is of course indisputable 
that there are important influences on Heidegger’s thinking about Being that emanate from sources 
outside of the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology, and these will be noted.  Nevertheless, 
Heidegger’s recovery of the ‘Being-question’ within phenomenology and phenomenological research is 
dependent in part upon Heidegger’s interpretation and evaluation of Husserl’s definitive position in 
phenomenology.  Hence, the title of this paper: ‘Heidegger’s Recovery of the ‘Being-question’ in Light 
of His Interpretation and Evaluation of Husserl’s Transcendental Reduction’. 
 
‘If to think and to be thought are different, from which of these  
does thinking derive its excellence?  For indeed it is not the  
same thing to be thinking and to be being thought.’ 
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Lambda 9. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Husserl characterized his famous reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendental-
phenomenological standpoint in Part Two: ‘The Phenomenological Fundamental Consideration of 
Idea’ (1913) as a genuine return to ‘talk of Being’ (Seinsrede).1  Heidegger certainly did not disagree 
with this claim, or with this understanding of phenomenology.2  What, then, does Husserl say about 
Being in the Fundamental Consideration that has a bearing on Heidegger’s philosophical position in 
phenomenology?  This is the issue that I propose to address in this paper.  This particular issue is 
connected to the wider and deeply contentious matter of Heidegger’s philosophical relation to 
Husserl’s thought and to the development of that thought, and hence some reference to this matter will 
be necessary.  For the purposes of this paper, however, I will focus on Heidegger’s controversial 
recovery of the ‘Being-question’ (die Seinsfrage) in light of his interpretation and evaluation of 
Husserl’s transcendental reduction. 
 
1. HUSSERL’S ‘TALK OF BEING’ IN THE REDUCTION AND HEIDEGGER’S TALK OF ‘ONTOLOGICAL 
DIFFERENCE’ 
 ‘The Fundamental Consideration’ of Ideas represents a meditation on Being.  More 
particularly, it represents for Husserl a meditation on Being as thing (Sein als Ding) given to outer 
sense perception and on Being as experience (Sein als Erlebnis) given to immanent perception (within 
inner reflection).3  In ‘The Fundamental Consideration’, therefore, two different ways in which the 
meaning of Being manifests itself are compared and assessed; namely, a natural(istic) and a 
phenomenological way of talking about Being.  It seems to me that Husserl makes several important 
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points in his ‘talk of Being’ in the reduction that could have lead Heidegger to believe that questioning 
the meaning of Being is the central issue at stake (die Sache selbst)  in phenomenological research, and 
not the singular development of phenomenology as a systematic eidetic science of pure intentional 
consciousness and its objectivity (as Husserl himself thought), after consciousness has been purified of 
all naturalistic misinterpretations via the reduction.4  If this is true, however, then here we have one 
very important philosophical source of the origins of Heidegger’s controversial ‘path of thinking’ about 
‘the Being-question’ within phenomenology and phenomenological research. 
 Husserl’s meditation in ‘The Fundamental Consideration’ culminates in a number of 
conclusions about the Being of a thing given to outer sense perception (and by extension about the 
Being of the ‘world’, which is understood by Husserl as simply the ‘totality of things’ that can be 
encountered by means of outer perceptual-sense experience) and about the Being of one’s own actual 
consciousness.  Between these two modes of Being, Husserl discovers ‘a true abyss of sense’(Abgrund 
des Sinnes).  ‘On the one hand we have a merely contingent and relative being in adumbration, never 
absolutely given, and on the other hand a necessary and absolute being which, in principle, is not given 
through adumbration and appearance.’5  Husserl’s point is a simple point.  A thing, because it is spatial 
in essence, shows itself ‘one-sidedly’ and ‘in adumbration’ to one’s actual outer perceptual-sense 
experiences.  Further legitimating (ausweisende) outer perceptual-sense experiences confirm the 
appearing of the thing in its very manner of being to consciousness.  A thing ‘is never such that it has 
nothing to do with consciousness and the conscious ego.’6   A thing which, in principle, cannot be 
experienced would be a simple ‘nonsense’.  In addition to the one side that is given through perspective 
variations, then, there is a horizon of ‘co-givenness’ (Mitgegenbenheit) that is as yet undeterminate.  
This always makes possible new perceptions of the same legitimating order ‘where the indeterminate 
becomes determinate’.  The perception of a thing, therefore, at any given time, points to possible 
further perceptions of that thing itself.  Hence, the actual perception of a thing can never ‘in principle’ 
be completed.  It is always possible, however, that that which is given to one’s own actual outer 
perceptual-sense experiences could turn out to be other than it actually is.  Further outer perceptual-
sense experiences may ‘modify’ what is actually given.  In fact, further outer perceptual-sense 
experiences of the same thing may ‘cross out’ altogether the initial perception(s).  In such an event, the 
perceptions I have of the thing ‘abound in conflicts that are irreconcilable, not for us but in 
themselves’.  In such cases, the perceptual experience of the thing itself fails to fit harmoniously 
together as a connective whole (Zusammenhang).  Experience (Erfahrung) ‘explodes’.7  In this event, 
then, it is the experiences themselves, i.e. the actual acts of outer perceptual-sense experience that 
‘cross out’ the very meaning and the very being of the thing itself that is given to experience.  Failure 
of the unity of one’s actual experiences to harmonize, therefore, results in ‘a cancelling’ of the very 
thing itself, in its very being.  Failure of the unity of one’s actual experiences, however, would not 
result in the non-existence of consciousness.  Rather absence of unity implies multiplicity.  Hence, 
what would be left over, after such a ‘world-annihilation thought-experiment’, is consciousness (i.e. 
unconnected intentional outer perceptual-sense experiences) that would not constitute the world as we 
know it.  Things, then, are not encountered in their being as the thesis of the natural standpoint would 
have it.  Rather, things are constituted in the very manner of being as intentional correlates of one’s 
own actual consciousness.8  Thus, as De Boer aptly comments, ‘Transcendental phenomenology is 
‘presuppositionless’ for exactly this reason, for it is aware that the world cannot be accepted as ground 
since consciousness is the true ground and basis.’9   
 In sharp contrast to the outer perception of a thing, in the immanent perception of a 
consciously lived psychical act-experience (Erlebnis) the experience cannot but be seen to exist.  The 
non-existence of a currently lived psychical act-experience in unthinkable.  Thus consciousness — and 
not things that are presumptively given to one’s actual outer perceptual-sense experiences — can 
provide Husserl with an apodictic starting point in his philosophy.  Transcendental phenomenology, 
then, is ‘presuppositionless’ for it does not presuppose that things are there, whether attention is 
directed towards them, or not, as held in the (hypo)thesis of the natural standpoint.  Rather, 
transcendental phenomenology begins with consciousness and its objectivity, with a view to 
researching the intricate web of intentional experiences that it contains within itself.10  In sum, the 
sphere of consciousness is a ‘sphere of absolute positing’.11 
 The first and most important discovery that Husserl makes in the reduction, then, is that there 
is an abyss within the meaning (Sinn) of Being (Sein) itself, when we talk about the meaning of Being 
that characterizes either the mode of the Being of a thing given to outer (sense) perception or the mode 
of the Being of an experience given to immanent perception.12  However, Husserl can only differentiate 
these two modes of Being as a result of questioning the way the meaning of Being itself is given to 
such experiences, in this particular case, in respect to the way Being as thing is given to outer sense 
perception and to the way Being as experience (als Erlebnis) is given to immanent perception.  The 
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negative outcome of such questioning of the meaning of Being demonstrates that the gulf between 
‘consciousness’ and ‘thing’ is so unbridgeable that consciousness can never be regarded either to be a 
thing (material thing) in the world or to be part of a thing in the world that is perceivable, if need be, by 
means of outer perceptual-sense experience.  Without engaging in such a radical questioning of the 
meaning of Being, therefore, we remain within the natural standpoint oblivious to the absurdity of the 
ontological position contained within that standpoint, which maintains that things given to outer sense 
perception are simply there (vorhanden), whether attention is directed towards them, or not, and they 
are there, also, as constituted intentional correlates of one’s actual experiences.13  Furthermore, without 
questioning the meaning of Being, we, also, remain within the natural standpoint oblivious to the fact 
that one’s own actual consciousness can never in principle be capable of being examined properly in its 
manner of being in the same way that a thing is examined in its relation to other things within the world 
given to outer perceptual-sense experience.  A fortiori, natural-scientific investigations into things in 
and of the world fail to see in principle the way my actual consciousness exists in its true being which, 
as the reduction also unveils, is as a necessary (pre)condition for the appearing of a meaningful world 
in its very existence to actual (human) consciousness.  My actual lived experiences — and my 
experiences are the kinds of things that cannot but be lived — and the things within the world given to 
my acts of outer perception, therefore, cannot be properly understood to be part of one and the same 
homogenous ‘totality of reality’, no matter how natural this may seem for anyone.14  My actual 
consciousness of things (given through outer perceptual-sense experience) cannot be something that 
sometimes binds itself to the life of my consciousness and sometimes not.  That is to say, things cannot 
be declared to be simply there, lying-in-stock (vorhanden), whether perceptual attention is directed 
towards them or not, as erroneously assumed in the thesis of the natural standpoint.  Rather, the sole 
‘reality’ that truly exists in itself, and which I can know apodictically to exist, turns out to be not a 
thing (res) at all.  My ‘actual’ consciousness is the sole ‘reality’ containing and constituting all world 
transcendencies within itself.15  Indeed, in so far as other human beings exist as centres of actual sense-
bestowing consciousness of the world, and assuming that other human beings enjoy similar first-person 
experiences as myself, then the human being qua transcendental ego, in Husserl’s view, is a member of 
a community of monads.16  Nevertheless, what the reduction unveils its that it is my actual 
consciousness, and not a thing (matter), that is the ‘ontic presupposition’ (Seinsvoraussetzung) of the 
world.17  My actual consciousness bears the ontological mystery of the world. 
 In the reduction, my actual consciousness is demonstrated to be both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for the very meaning and being of the reality of the world in its appearance to 
human consciousness.  The meaning of the Being of the ‘world’ is thereby clarified in and through the 
reduction, and the ‘suspension of a natural interpretation of total reality is at the same time a return to 
total reality — now in purified form’.18  The ‘fundamental and essential difference’ between ‘Being as 
thing’ and ‘Being as experience’, the ‘most cardinal distinction of all’ upon which the entire analysis of 
‘The Phenomenological Fundamental Consideration’ rests, is brought, therefore, to its originary 
givenness through a radical questioning of the meaning of Being that is exhibited in and through a 
particularly unique being in Being, namely, my actual consciousness.  And these results are, Husserl 
insists, repeatable thought-experiments for other actual consciousnesses (as beings) in Being.  Thus 
Husserl’s philosophical meditation in the ‘reduction’ is conducted not only in response to the question 
‘what does Being mean?’, but also in response to some understanding of what it is to be a being in 
Being, that it so say, with some understanding of ‘the difference’ between Being and beings, what 
Heidegger calls in his thinking about Being, ‘the ontological difference’.19 
 One of the central conclusions of Husserl’s questioning of our usual ‘talk of Being’ in the 
reduction, therefore, is that a thing, as actually given to me through natural modes of outer perceptual-
sense experience, cannot be said ‘to be’ without qualification.  This is important, for this conclusion 
clearly demonstrates that Husserl’s understanding of ‘ontology’ is firmly in keeping within the modern 
tradition of post-Kantian criticism, and not, say, in keeping within the classical tradition of 
Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of ‘ontology’ (metaphysics), such as Brentano, for instance, had 
examined and defended in his 1862 doctoral study On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle.  For 
Husserl, a thing, as it actually exists, exists only as a being for an actual consciousness; it exists only as 
an intentional correlate of experiential connections of one’s actual consciousness.  A thing is only 
insofar as it is correlative to the actual harmony of experiences in which and through which it is 
constituted in its being.  A thing is ‘not something absolute in itself’.  That is to say, for Husserl, a 
thing is not a being (ein Seiendes) in being (Sein) in its own right, and hence, a thing cannot be 
understood to be a being in itself as such.20  A thing lacks any such ontological self-sufficiency 
(Selbständigkeit).21  A thing given to outer perceptual-sense experience is simply not a substance. 
 It is an implicit assumption in Husserl’s thought, therefore, that only that which can exist 
absolutely in itself, that is to say, in its own right as a being in Being, can be said truly ‘to be’.  Things 
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given to outer perceptual-sense experience do not qualify under this criterion.  In a very important 
sense, things (Dinge) given to perception cannot, strictly speaking, be called beings (Seienden) at all.  
Accordingly, all forms of natural ontology which (allegedly) purport to explain the Being of such 
things of the world from within the natural standpoint, are based upon an erroneous (hypo)thesis.  Such 
a metabasis that underpins all talk of Being in the natural standpoint cannot be the philosophical basis 
upon which to build either a philosophical ontology of the natural world of things given to outer 
perceptual-sense experience or a philosophical ontology of the mind.  Hence Heidegger’s insistence in 
Being and Time, following Husserl’s insistence in Ideas, that no forms of realism are truly 
philosophical forms of thought at all, if it is the ‘understanding of Being’ that we seek.22 
 My actual consciousness, however, does qualify under the above criterion as a being in Being. 
Or, perhaps more accurately stated, the non-existence of a perceived experience in an act of immanent 
perception is unthinkable.  We can say, without qualification, of the presently lived (given) experience 
in the immanent perception of that experience that it is.  In immanent perception, I have certain 
knowledge of its being (seiend) a being (Seiendes) in Being (Sein).  I can say unqualifiedly of my 
currently lived psychical act-experience immanently perceived that it is a being (Seiendes) in Being 
(Sein).  A perceived experience in immanent perception, then, is unqualifiedly a being in Being.  Thus 
Husserl’s philosophical meditation in the ‘reduction’ is conducted in response to the question, ‘what 
does Being mean?’, and with some reference to some understanding of the Being of beings 
(experiences) in Being, hence, to some understanding of ‘the ontological difference’, because Being 
itself is evidently not understood by Husserl, or by anyone else, to be a being in Being. 
 
2. IMMANENT PERCEPTION, DASEIN AND ‘ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE’ 
 In his reduction to the absolute domain of positing that characterizes one’s own actual 
consciousness, Husserl also points out that while reflecting upon this conscious life streaming past me 
in immanent perception, we can say three things without qualification, ‘that I am’, ‘this life of mine is,’ 
‘cogito.’23  All of these apodictic truths are equally grounded and equally founded in the certainty of 
knowledge of the Being of beings.  All of these truths comply with Husserl’s implicit understanding of 
Being that only certainty in knowledge in respect to the Being of beings can represent genuine 
philosophical ‘talk of Being’.  No natural science can represent  ‘talk of Being’.  Natural science is not 
directly engaged in determining with apodictic insight the Being of beings that it methodologically 
investigates, interprets and systematically analyses.  Natural scientists necessarily overlook the 
question of the meaning of Being.24 Husserl made this point in Ideas long before Heidegger made the 
same point later in Being and Time.  What Husserl himself overlooks, however, is that some 
‘understanding of Being’ in its difference to [the understanding of the being of] beings is also given in 
the very knowledge of the immanent perception of a currently lived psychical act-experience (and its 
intentional object, if it exists) and in the discernible, accompanying apodictic facts, ‘that I am,’ ‘this life 
of mine is’, cogito.  The way Being itself is understood is thus left unthought in Husserl’s reduction.  
Or, perhaps more accurately speaking, the way the question of the meaning of Being is to be addressed 
in Husserl’s reduction must be curtailed and confined to an eidetic analysis of the meaning of Being as 
thing given to outer sense perception and to the meaning of Being as experience immanently perceived.  
The fundamental consideration of phenomenology on the issue of the question of the meaning of Being 
itself, then, as far as Heidegger is concerned, is not fundamental enough. 
 Husserl is quite clear and insistent on the point that phenomenological knowledge-claims must 
conform to certainty of the knowledge of Being. Husserl, also, is quite clear and insistent on the point 
that no such criterion is expected of either natural correspondence or natural adequation theories of 
truth.  Nevertheless, Husserl, also, admits and recognizes that the certainty of the understanding of 
one’s own existence — ‘this life of mine is’ — is not a certainty that is given (or can be given) to outer 
perceptual-sense experience.  Furthermore, the understanding of the being of oneself in existence — 
‘that I am’— that is given in an act of immanent perception (of a currently lived psychical act-
experience) is evidently not itself (reducible to) a currently lived psychical act-experience.  
Nevertheless, knowledge of one’s own existence is still a certainty, an existential certainty, and an 
experience of what it is to be a being in Being.25  Therefore, what Husserl’s reduction uncovers, but 
without investigating it, is that the understanding of Being that I have of my very existence in Being is 
an understanding that I do not gain either by way of things given to outer sense perception or by way of 
an immanent perception of a psychical act-experience.  So, how is this understanding of Being given?  
It is in response to this issue that Heidegger develops differently Husserl’s return to genuine ‘talk of 
Being’ in the reduction.  This time Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard and to the existentialist tenet that 
human existence is the only kind of existence that is experienced from within.  Thus Heidegger joins 
Husserl’s hand to Kierkegaard’s and turns to the Seinsverständnis that is deposited in the awareness of 
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the ‘There of Being’ in which I find myself implicated as a being in Being, that is to say, in what 
Heidegger calls ‘Da-Sein’.26  With this philosophical move, a new concept of ‘transcendental 
phenomenology’ as ‘fundamental ontology’ is born. 
  It is, of course, true that I can see myself (in natural psychological apperception) as a being 
among other beings in the world.  This natural knowledge I have of myself as a being amidst other 
beings in the world, however, totally overlooks, and thus totally undermines the hidden 
phenomenological truth, made visible only in the reduction, concerning the way my actual 
consciousness does exist as a necessary and sufficient condition for the very being and meaning of the 
world of things. The natural positing of the world ‘out there’ in the thesis of the natural standpoint 
absolutizes the world; that is to say, in the thesis of the natural standpoint the world (of material things) 
is hailed and held presumptively as a primary and undifferentiated manifestation of Being itself.  In 
doing so, however, this natural position blocks access to knowledge of the essential being of 
consciousness and to the discovery that one’s own actual consciousness is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the very existence of the world of things of experience.  Thus the natural 
standpoint blocks access to questioning the fundamental meaning of Being in any genuine ‘talk of 
Being’.  For Husserl, of course, this means that the transcendental-constituting power of consciousness 
can never be seen as it truly is, as long as one remains in the natural standpoint.  Rather, ‘we will arrive 
at a radical insight into consciousness only via a special phenomenological reflection, a reflection 
which does not participate in the general positing of the natural world.’27  In a very important sense, 
therefore, for Husserl the joint discoveries of the apodictic certainties of the relativity of the being of 
the world and of the necessity and absoluteness of the being of pure consciousness go together in his 
famous ‘reduction’ to genuine ‘talk of Being’, and hence to his subsequent revision of our natural 
ontology.28  Both of these discoveries, however, leave unaddressed and unthought the ‘understanding 
of Being’ that is part of one’s own awareness of the ‘There of Being’ in which one finds oneself 
implicated as a being in Being.  And if Heidegger is right, and if ‘we’, from an existential-
phenomenological point of view, are implicated in our existence as beings in Being in such a fashion so 
as to have always some understanding, however vague, of what it means to be a being in Being, then 
the ‘Being-question’ in its relation to Dasein is never that far off.  In what way, therefore, does Husserl 
understand what it means to be a being in Being in his reduction to the question of the meaning of 
Being?  And how does Heidegger differ in his understanding of what it means to be a being in Being in 
his reduction to the question of the meaning of Being?  It is outside the limits of this paper to discuss 
this matter, however, it is suffice to say that it will make all the difference to one’s quest to reach such 
an ‘understanding of the Being of a being in Being’ which Husserl’s transcendental reduction invites, 
whether one takes an innerwordly being as thing within the world given to outer sense perception, or an 
experience immanently perceived, or one’s own manner of being-in-the-world, where the world is not 
understood as simply the totality of things that can be given, if need be, to outer perceptual-sense 
experience, as Heidegger chooses to do in Being and Time. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 According to Husserl, the ‘usual meaning of the talk of Being is reversed’ as one moves from 
the natural standpoint to the philosophical-transcendental-phenomenological standpoint.29  That is to 
say, the way we naturally regard both things to be simply there (vorhanden) and encountered in Being 
and our consciousness to be something that is secondarily and relatively related to such things in Being, 
is turned around.  Things do not exist, and then I become conscious of them, as I naturally presume.  
Rather my consciousness actually exists first, then things appear; that is to say, only then does Being as 
thing (Sein als Ding) appear.  Accordingly, just as things are seen in their proper manifestation as 
beings in Being that exist in relation to my temporal consciously lived experiences, my temporal 
consciously lived, psychical act intentional experiences are, also, now seen as the proper manifestation 
of beings in Being.  This philosophical ‘inversion’ of the understanding of Being that occurs in 
Husserl’s ‘reduction’, however, would appear to leave the question of the meaning of Being itself and 
its temporality not addressed, as paradoxically as this may sound.  And the very being who has some 
understanding of Being and to whom such an understanding of Being is given, Dasein, is left out of the 
equation in Husserl’s reduction to genuine ‘talk of Being’.  Hence, Heidegger can say that in Husserl’s 
reduction the question of the meaning of Being itself is closed off because it is both raised and 
answered.  And a question that is acknowledged and answered is a question that is overlooked als 
Frage.  This is why the question of the meaning of Being is something that does not and cannot 
become the ‘thematic topic’ of concern in Husserl’s reduction.  Thus, in this respect, Heidegger 
(justifiably) asserts that the question of the meaning of Being is something that remains ‘unthought in 
the matter of philosophy’ of Husserl’s phenomenology.30  Hence, it is in light of the absence of any 
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such questioning of the meaning of Being itself that is already deposited in the ‘understanding of 
Being’ that is talked about in the reduction, that Heidegger is forced to remark to his students towards 
the beginning of his lecture course on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, which he began to 
deliver some six weeks after the publication of Being and Time in 1927,  
 For Husserl, phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time expressly in 
the Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy  (1913), is the method of 
leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in 
the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noematic 
experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness.  For us, phenomenological 
reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever 
might be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projecting 
upon the way it is unconcealed).31 
 In Heidegger’s view, therefore, the intentionality of consciousness, the celebrated theme of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, is founded upon a more original intentionality, namely, ‘the understanding 
of Being’.  Explicating this concept of intentionality becomes the basic (neo-Kantian) problem of 
phenomenology for Heidegger.  As Heidegger had already put it and tried to work through in Being 
and Time, ‘(O)ur analytic [of Dasein] raises the ontological question of the Being of the ‘sum’.  Not 
until the nature of this Being has been determined can we grasp the kind of Being (Seinsart) which 
belongs to cogitationes’.32  With this insistence on securing ‘Dasein’ as the ‘phenomenal basis’ upon 
which to retrieve ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein), 
Heidegger invariably and necessarily displaces the overtly Cartesian emphasis on the actual 
consciousness of the ‘mentally active subject’ in phenomenology and phenomenological research that 
Husserl had unquestionably inherited from Brentano (the descriptive psychologist).   
 The critical question that Heidegger raises within phenomenology, then, is this.  Is the 
temporal intentional structure of one’s own actual experiences a psychical event that can be abstracted 
from my own finite temporality in being and from my own awareness of the ‘There of Being’ (Dasein) 
in which I find myself implicated as a being in Being?  If not, then the apodictic experience of the 
absolute givenness of a presently lived psychical act-experience (and its intentional object, if it exists) 
in immanent perception points to the existence of the being of a radical and unreduced ontological 
finiteness and temporality within that actual experience itself.  Consequently, the phenomenal basis 
upon which Husserl’s own transcendental deduction of the infinity of experiences for inner reflection 
within the transcendental-phenomenological reduction to pure intentional consciousness rests upon the 
givenness of the ontological finiteness of experiences in themselves that lies outside of the parameters 
of research that Husserl methodologically set both to and for eidetic and transcendental 
phenomenological inquiry.  If this is true, however, then the infinity of actual experiences for such a 
phenomenological science is ontologically indemonstrable, or, more exactly stated, ontologically 
indefensible, for the very idea of an infinity of (inner) reflections on actual experiences is as much a 
fictional thesis on (the way to understand) Being, as is the ‘original’ idea of the infinity of the actual 
world of things posited pre-predicatively in the thesis of the natural standpoint a fictional philosophical 
thesis on (the way to understand) Being of things given to outer perceptual-sense experience.  If it is 
Heidegger’s intention to call us back to a correct understanding of Being that is appropriate to the 
experience of the finiteness of the being of beings in their Being, and it seems to me that it is all of his 
intention, then an acknowledgement of the being of the being of beings that are given finitely in their 
originality and in their temporality has to be granted first, before any understanding of Being has 
arrived.  However, such a ‘metaphysical’ acknowledgement is expressly excluded, first by Husserl in 
his transcendental-phenomenological reduction, and second by Heidegger in his reduction to 
‘fundamental ontology’.  And yet, such a metaphysics is clearly acknowledged in both of their 
respective phenomenological ‘ontologies’, but it is, also, clearly left ‘unthought’.  Heidegger’s recovery 
of the ‘Being-question’ in phenomenology and in phenomenological research, therefore, is, like 
Husserl’s, but a partial recovery. 
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